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Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECHR’ or ‘the
Convention’) – as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
‘the European Court’ or ‘the Strasbourg Court’) – regularly requires changes in the
domestic legislation, case law and administrative practices of State parties. However, as
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an international court, the Strasbourg Court has very limited formal competences for
ensuring compliance with its own judgments. Accordingly, recent debate on the
effectiveness of the ECHR system has concentrated on securing the domestic
implementation of ECHR rights.1 The role of the domestic authorities in the ECHR
system has been depicted as crucial because they ‘do the “heavy lifting” required to
comply’.2 More specifically, domestic authorities play two essential roles within the
processes of implementation3 of the EuropeanCourt’s judgments. First, they diffuse the
European Court’s conclusions as they transform them into general, domestically
applicable rules. Second, they subsequently apply such rules and perform the role of
filters vis-à-vis the European Court by preventing or remedying human rights violations
at the national level.4
At the domestic level of the ECHR system, one actor has traditionally been
portrayed as an important ally of the European Court – the constitutional court.5
Constitutional courts are usually singled out from the rest of the domestic judiciary as
institutions particularly well placed to contribute to the implementation of the
Strasbourg Court’s case law and enhance the legitimacy of the ECHR system.6 They
have been depicted as the European Court’s partners,7 having a crucial impact on how
far Strasbourg Court’s case law permeates the domestic legal order.8
1See e.g. High-level Conference on the Implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, our shared responsibility – Brussels Declaration (2015). See also L. Helfer, ‘Redesigning the
European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European
Human Rights Regime’, 19 EJIL (2008) p. 125.
2C. Hillebrecht, ‘The Power of Human Rights Tribunals: Compliance with the European Court
of Human Rights and domestic policy change’, 20 EJIR (2014) p. 1100 at p. 1117.
3 In this article, the term ‘implementation’ refers to the domestic process centred around the
reaction to the European Court’s judgment. Such a broad understanding allows both the positive
steps leading to compliance and the rather negative steps leading to partial compliance or non-
compliance to be taken into account. For details on implementation of the European Court’s case
law, see e.g. E. Lambert-Abdelgawad, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (CoE Publishing 2008).
4D. Kosař and J. Petrov, ‘The Architecture of the Strasbourg System of Human Rights: The
Crucial Role of the Domestic Level and the Constitutional Courts in Particular’, 77Heidelberg J Int'l L
(2017) p. 585.
5 I have chosen to concentrate on Kelsenian constitutional courts – specialised courts entitled to
strike down legislation as unconstitutional. V. Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and
Democratic Values: A European Perspective (Yale University Press 2009) p. xiii-xiv.
6D. Paris, ‘Allies and Counterbalances. Constitutional Courts and the European Court of
Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective’, 77 Heidelberg J Int'l L (2017) p. 623.
7W. Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of
Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the
Idea of Pilot Judgments’, 9 HRL Rev. (2009) p. 397 at p. 402.
8C. van de Heyning, ‘The Natural ‘Home’ of Fundamental Rights Adjudication: Constitutional
Challenges to the European Court of Human Rights’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 128 at
p. 131.
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This article acknowledges constitutional courts’ importance in the
implementation of ECHR rights. However, it also argues that the domestic
implementation environment is more complex and asks for a more nuanced
approach in assessing the role of constitutional courts in implementing the
European Court’s case law. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it aims to
specify what forms the partnership of the European Court and constitutional
courts takes in the context of implementing the European Court’s judgments and
what benefits it brings to the ECHR system. Second, it examines under what
conditions the partnership can actually work and deliver such benefits.
Accordingly, in order to map the forms of the partnership, this article first offers
a typology of the roles played by constitutional courts in mechanisms of
implementation of the European Court’s case law. Subsequently, it examines the
conditions under which constitutional courts have the capacity to perform the
roles listed in the typology and secure compliance with the European Court’s
judgments (partnership capacity).
Looking at the partnership between the constitutional courts and the European
Court, many constitutional courts have indeed embraced Strasbourg case law as a
common feature of constitutional adjudication. The ECHR has gained prominent
status9 in the legal orders of many State parties, and the European Court’s rulings
are regularly taken into account by constitutional courts.10 This can be seen as a
mutually beneficial practice. The Strasbourg Court’s rulings serve as guidance for
constitutional courts; they provide a means of bolstering a constitutional court’s
persuasiveness or can even serve as a shield against opposing domestic actors.11
From the Strasbourg Court’s point of view, by relying on the European Court’s
case law, constitutional courts increase the effectiveness of the ECHR system.
They can act as particularly effective diffusers and filters of the European Court’s
case law. They regularly reinterpret domestic laws in a manner consistent with
European Court’s case law, and several constitutional courts use the ECHR – as
interpreted by the European Court – as a reference point for the review of
legislation or at least as guidance for the interpretation of constitutional rights.12
9SeeH. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National
Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2012).
10See J. Gerards and J. Fleuren (eds.), Implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law (Intersentia 2014).
11See L. Garlicki and I. Kondak, ‘Poland: Human rights between international and constitutional
law’, in I. Motoc and I. Ziemele (eds.), The Impact of the ECHR on Democratic Change in Central and
Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 326 at p. 329; Sadurski, supra n. 7, p. 438.
12For example, the Italian (post-2007) and Czech constitutional courts view the ECHR as a
yardstick for the review of legislation. The Spanish and German constitutional courts use the ECHR
for the interpretation of domestic constitutional rights. See numerous other examples in Paris,
supra n. 6, and C. van de Heyning, ‘Constitutional courts as guardians of fundamental rights:
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A closer look, however, shows that there are at least two important features
which require clarification of the constitutional courts’ position within the
implementation mechanisms: the interaction of constitutional courts with other
actors; and the constitutional courts’ discretion in dealing with the European
Court’s case law. First, although constitutional courts belong among the ‘central
actors’ implementing the European Court’s case law,13 they are not the sole actors
involved in the implementation mechanisms, nor are they omnipotent. Often,
constitutional courts have to interact with other actors, mainly with law-making or
law-applying bodies. In the end, the outcomes of the implementation processes
depend upon mutual interaction between these actors, their powers, and their
willingness to employ them.14
The second important feature is the factual discretion constitutional courts
have when dealing with the European Court’s case law.15 Constitutional courts
tend to accept the European Court’s conclusions; their decision-making then leads
to convergence with ECHR standards. Certain frictions between constitutional
courts and the European Court can emerge, though,16 as a constitutional court’s
complete embrace of ECHR standards can also threaten its autonomy.17
Constitutional courts thus also engage more actively with the European Court’s
jurisprudence, and may even resist it.18 Accordingly, constitutional courts
sometimes resort to a narrow reading of the Strasbourg Court’s rulings in order
to limit their impact, or they might initiate a judicial dialogue to persuade the
European Court to reassess its view. More rarely, constitutional courts silently or
The constitutionalization of the Convention through domestic constitutional adjudication’, in
P. Popelier et al. (eds.), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013)
p. 21.
13D. Anagnostou, ‘Politics, courts and society in the national implementation and practice of
European Court of Human Rights case law’, in D. Anagnostou (ed.), The European Court of Human
Rights: Implementing Strasbourg's Judgments on Domestic Policy (Edinburgh University Press 2013)
p. 211.
14C. Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of
Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 25.
15See N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’, 71 MLR (2008)
p. 185 at p. 215.
16G. Martinico, ‘National Courts and Judicial Disobedience to the ECHR: A Comparative
Overview’, in O.M. Arnardóttir and A. Buyse (eds.), Shifting Centres of Gravity in Human Rights
Protection (Routledge 2016) p. 59; V. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era
(Oxford University Press 2010) p. 92 and p. 94.
17D. Anagnostou, ‘Untangling the domestic implementation of the European Court of Human
Rights’ judgments’, in Anagnostou (ed.), supra n. 13, p. 1 at p. 13; A. Stone Sweet and H. Keller,
‘Introduction: The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders’, in Keller and Stone Sweet,
supra n. 9, at p. 20.
18 I have borrowed the concepts of convergence, engagement and resistance from Jackson,
supra n. 16.
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even explicitly reject the Strasbourg Court’s conclusions. At a more general level,
several constitutional courts have also devised doctrines that limit the European
Court’s impact on national law.19 As a result, it cannot be taken for granted that
constitutional courts will completely embrace the whole body of Strasbourg
case law.
Acknowledging these developments, the contribution of this article is twofold.
First, it shows and systematises the various ways constitutional courts contribute
to the effective functioning of the ECHR system. Constitutional courts correct
their own practices, conduct ordinary courts and law-making bodies in their
implementation efforts and evaluate their previous implementation steps. Second,
the article also shows that some constitutional courts are in fact better placed than
others to play these roles and partner with the European Court (furthermore in
some cases more than in others) and explains why this is so. More specifically, it
argues that the constitutional courts’ partnership capacity20 is subject to three sets
of conditions: a favourable institutional setting; a favourable political setting; and a
favourable attitude of the constitutional court towards the European Court’s
judgment. Only constitutional courts that are likely to be involved in
implementation mechanisms and are able and willing to secure compliance with
the Strasbourg judgments have a high partnership capacity. Such constitutional
courts can be relied on as the European Court’s major domestic compliance
partners – at least from a short-term perspective – as they can successfully fulfil
most of the roles listed in the typology. However, in the case of constitutional
courts with lower partnership capacities, the European Court and pro-compliance
actors must build partnerships with other actors, too. Partnering with actors other
than constitutional courts is also important from a long-term perspective because
estimations of a constitutional court’s partnership capacity will always include an
element of uncertainty. Moreover, a constitutional court’s partnership capacity
can change over time and across issues.
The article proceeds in seven parts. After this introduction, the second part
briefly presents the typology of the roles played by constitutional courts in the
mechanisms of implementation of the European Court’s case law. The following
three parts introduce the individual categories of the typology and refer to concrete
examples from the ECHR system. The sixth part examines the conditions under
which constitutional courts are likely to play the roles presented by the typology
and bring about the desired benefits for the ECHR system. It probes the elements
19B. Peters, ‘The Rule of Law Dimensions of Dialogues between National Courts and
Strasbourg’, in M. Kanetake and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), The Rule of Law at the National and
International Levels (Hart 2016) p. 201 at p. 210-215, and references cited therein.
20Partnership capacity denotes the likeliness of a constitutional court’s involvement in
implementation, plus its ability and willingness to secure compliance with the European Court’s
judgments. See ‘Varying partnership capacity of constitutional courts’ below.
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of the partnership capacity of constitutional courts and explains the consequences
it has for the politics of implementing the European Court’s case law. Finally,
there is a concluding part.
The typology
The central part of this article is a typology of the roles played by constitutional
courts in the mechanisms of implementation of the European Court’s case law.21
It is informed by the domestic politics theories of compliance with the judgments
of international courts. These theories emphasise that international courts
influence state behaviour through the medium of domestic politics.
Implementation of international case law thus depends on the interaction
between the domestic actors involved in the compliance mechanisms and on the
international court’s ability to build domestic pro-compliance coalitions.22
The typology was developed in an inductive way through several cycles of
gradual generalisations from the existing cases of implementation of the European
Court’s judgments.23 Three main sources of information about these cases were
used. The main sources were the resolutions of the Committee of Ministers
regarding supervision of the execution of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.24
These usually contain an appendix providing information submitted by the
respective government about the measures adopted to implement the judgment.
Yet, the resolutions usually restrict themselves to positive developments.
Therefore, the inquiry was supplemented with other sources in order to grasp
cases of resistance, too. The major recent comparative volumes on the impact of
the ECHR on national legal orders25 and cases reported in the International Law
in Domestic Courts database were consulted. The typology also takes into account
21 I concentrate on general measures and I acknowledge both the inter partes binding effect of the
European Court’s rulings (Art. 46 ECHR) and the res interpretata effect of Strasbourg judgments. As
a result, I have taken into account both the judgments addressed to the given country and to other
countries. See A. Bodnar, ‘Res Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human Rights’
Judgments for other States Than Those Which Were Party to the Proceedings’, in Y. Haeck and
E. Brems (eds.), Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century (Springer 2014) p. 223.
22See supra n. 14, and K. Alter, ‘Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction
of International and Domestic Politics’, 13 CYELS (2011) p. 1.
23See A.L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(MIT Press 2005) p. 240.
24 I have made use of nearly 300 resolutions in English containing the terms ‘constitutional court’,
‘constitutional tribunal’ or ‘constitutional council’ and nearly 240 resolutions in French containing
the terms ‘cour constitutionnelle’, ‘tribunal constitutionnel’ or ‘conseil constitutionnel’.
25Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n. 9; Anagnostou (ed.), supra n. 13; Gerards and Fleuren, supra n.
10; A. Donald and P. Leach, Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford
University Press 2016); I. Motoc and I. Ziemele (eds.), The Impact of the ECHR on Democratic
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cases from both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Council of Europe members to illustrate the
breadth of potential issues.
The typology, summarised in Table 1, is constructed along two dimensions.
This acknowledges that implementation of the Strasbourg judgments is ‘a multi-
faceted and inherently political process’,26 usually involving different domestic
actors in different positions. The implementation of the Strasbourg case law is a
process of changing the status quo; the vertical dimension therefore reflects what
the source of ECHR violation was and what the object of change is – domestic
legislation, decisions of law-applying bodies (domestic jurisprudence) or even the
constitutional court’s own procedural and administrative practices.
The horizontal dimension takes into account that constitutional courts can
become involved in an implementation mechanism at different stages. They might
already be involved at an early phase of an implementation process – act as (one of)
the first actors domestically – and be able to set the agenda. In such cases,
constitutional courts act as initiators of implementation. However, other actors
can also take steps towards implementation, even before a constitutional court is
involved. In such cases, constitutional courts do not set the agenda but rather react
to steps already taken by other actors, for instance by supporting or altering them.
The distinction between a constitutional court’s involvement at an initial stage of
implementation and in a later phase is not strictly set in terms of time units. What
matters is whether any other actors have adopted implementation measures prior
to the constitutional court’s involvement.
Table 1. Role of constitutional courts in the mechanisms of implementation of the Strasbourg Court’s case law
Stage of constitutional court's (CC’s) involvement
Initial stage of







CC as a self-corrector CC as an object of changes
Decisions of domestic
law-applying bodies
CC as a conductor of
jurisprudential
implementation
CC as an evaluator of
jurisprudential
implementation
Domestic legislation CC as a conductor of
legislative implementation
CC as an evaluator of
legislative implementation
Change in Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press 2016); and The Impact of the
European Convention on Human Rights in States Parties – Selected Examples (CoE Publishing 2016).
26D. Anagnostou and A. Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Domestic Implementation of Human Rights
Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter’, 25 EJIL (2014)
p. 205 at p. 207.
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Combining the two dimensions, the typology works with six main categories of
constitutional court roles in implementation mechanisms.27 Moreover, with
respect to diverging constitutional courts’ preferences towards the Strasbourg
judgments at stake, constitutional courts can employ various techniques within a
given role. These techniques, which can lead to convergence, engagement or even
resistance to the European Court’s case law, are addressed below.
The following three parts analyse the categories laid down in the typology and
refer to specific examples involving various Council of Europe member states.
Although the context in which constitutional courts operate varies from state to
state and may affect the course of implementation mechanisms, for the purposes
of construing the typology this article treats the constitutional courts equally.
The common denominator is that the 47 member states of the Council of Europe
have all incorporated the Convention, making it binding on state authorities and
enforceable by domestic courts,28 and that they have some de facto discretion when
dealing with the ECHR and with Strasbourg case law.29 Nevertheless, the section
‘Varying partnership capacity of constitutional courts’, below, revisits the
significance of differences in the constitutional courts’ institutional designs and
the political environments in which they operate.
Changing a constitutional court’s procedural and administrative
practices and design
Although constitutional courts regularly function as domestic guardians of
fundamental rights, sometimes their own decisions and practices lead to violations
of the Convention. As the exhaustion of all (effective) domestic remedies is an
admissibility criterion enshrined in Article 35(1) ECHR, it is a commonplace that
the European Court de facto reviews the conduct of constitutional courts. The
Strasbourg Court not only deals with the substantive interpretation of law by the
constitutional courts but also examines their own procedural performance.30
Issues like the length of proceedings, compliance with the equality of arms
principle in the proceedings before the constitutional court, and too restrictive an
assessment of the admissibility of constitutional complaints by the constitutional
courts have all been subject to criticism from the Strasbourg Court.31
27The six roles are mutually exclusive at any one point in time. However, the constitutional courts
can play multiple roles across different phases of the implementation of one judgment.
28A. Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights
Adjudication in Europe’, 1 GlobCon (2012) p. 53 at p. 63.
29Stone Sweet and Keller, supra n. 17, at p. 14.
30See e.g. ECtHR [plenary] 23 June 1993, Case No. 12952/87, Ruiz-Mateos v Spain, paras.
55-60.
31See infra notes 33, 35, 40, 43, 46 and 48.
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For the sake of the comprehensiveness of our understanding of the various roles
of constitutional courts, this article devotes a special category to the cases in which
their administrative and procedural practices32 alone form a source of ECHR
violation. I distinguish those from situations in which a constitutional court
overturns its own substantive case law in response to the Strasbourg judgments;
this is addressed below. In the first scenario, the constitutional court is a central
actor capable of resolving the problem by changing its own practices. In many
cases, self-correction by the constitutional court alone serves as a sufficient
measure of non-repetition of the respective human rights violation. Therefore,
constitutional courts can secure compliance with the Strasbourg standards on their
own. Yet, in the latter cases concerning changes to substantive case law, the
constitutional courts correct themselves but, in addition, aim to orchestrate
implementation in order to safeguard compliance, also by other actors. In other
words, the self-correcting role is inward-looking, whereas the roles involving
changes to substantive case law contain important outward-looking elements, too.
This part of the article addresses the various roles the constitutional courts play
in inward-looking cases. They can act as self-correctors, but can also play a more
passive role and be subjected to changes in the design of the proceedings or of the
constitutional court itself.
Constitutional courts as self-correctors
To give a few specific examples of the active self-correcting role, the Czech
Constitutional Court has repeatedly been criticised by the Strasbourg Court for
performing a too restrictive and formalistic assessment of the admissibility of
constitutional complaints.33 In response to this criticism, Czech constitutional
judges discussed the issue at a plenary meeting and concluded that it was necessary
to avoid an excessively formalistic approach.34 In another set of cases, the
European Court found a violation of Article 6 ECHR since the Czech
Constitutional Court had not informed a complainant about submissions made
by other parties to the proceedings.35 Pursuant to these judgments, a plenary
32This section deals exclusively with cases in which the violation of the ECHR was caused by the
practices of the constitutional court, not by the underlying legislation regulating the proceedings
before the constitutional court as such. This is so because the latter cases fall into a different category
(discussed below) as the source of violation was the legislation itself.
33ECtHR 20 April 2004, Case No. 57567/00, Bulena v the Czech Republic; ECtHR 28 June
2005, Case No. 74328/01, Zedník v the Czech Republic; ECtHR 13 December 2005, Case No.
6019/03, Zemanová v the Czech Republic.
34Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)122, 3 December 2009.
35 Instead of many see ECtHR 21 June 2005, Case No. 61811/00,Milatová and others v the Czech
Republic.
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meeting of the Czech Constitutional Court adopted a recommendation inviting
judge-rapporteurs to communicate the parties’ submissions to the applicants
for possible commentary whenever they contained new facts, allegations or
arguments.36
ECHR-related problems can also emerge as regards access to constitutional
courts’ files. In Társaság a Szabadságjogokért the Strasbourg Court declared a
violation of Article 10 ECHR because the Constitutional Court of Hungary had
refused a non-governmental organisation access to a pending motion for abstract
review of constitutionality initiated by members of Parliament.37 In response to
the judgment, the Hungarian Constitutional Court granted the organisation
unlimited access to the given complaint.38
Sometimes the solution is not so straightforward, though, and theBěleš
constitutional court’s self-correction does not work. Another Czech case is a good
example of a complex implementation mechanism in which the constitutional
court plays multiple roles. The Czech legal order provides for extraordinary appeal
(dovolání),39 which can be filed in the Supreme Court. The unclear relationship
between extraordinary appeal and constitutional complaint proceedings has
caused many problems and several judgments in which the European Court has
declared that the practice of the Czech Constitutional Court violated the
applicant’s right of access to a court.40 In reaction to the Strasbourg judgments,
the Czech Constitutional Court first adopted a communication clarifying the
interpretation of the admissibility rules.41 Subsequently, the Czech Parliament
amended the Constitutional Court Act,42 but ‘convicting’ judgments from the
European Court followed even after the amendment.43 In 2012, the Czech
36Resolution ResDH(2006)71, 20 December 2006; see also Resolution CM/ResDH(2012)20,
8 March 2012.
37ECtHR 14 April 2009, Case No. 37374/05, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary.
38Resolution CM/ResDH(2012)191, 6 December 2012.
39For explanation of the extraordinary appeal in the Czech legal order see M. Bobek, ‘An
Introduction to the Czech Legal System and Legal Resources Online’, GlobalLex, 2006 (updated in
2014 by Olga Pouperová), <www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Czech_Republic.html>, visited
8 July 2018.
40See e.g. ECtHR 12 November 2002, Case No. 46129/99, Zvolský a Zvolská v the Czech
Republic; ECtHR 12 November 2002, Case No. 47273/99, Běleš v the Czech Republic. In the most
problematic cases the party lodged an extraordinary appeal and a constitutional complaint at the
same time. In this first phase, the constitutional complaint was dismissed as premature. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal as inadmissible, and the Constitutional Court
found the subsequent constitutional complaint to be belated. See ECtHR 24 February 2004, Case
No. 73577/01, Vodárenská akciová společnost v the Czech Republic.
41Commission of the Constitutional Court No. 32/2003 Coll.
42Act No. 83/2004 Coll.
43E.g. ECtHR 12October 2010, Case No. 35836/05, Adamíček v the Czech Republic; ECtHR 13
October 2011, Case No. 26908/09 and 30809/10, Tieze a Semeráková v the Czech Republic.
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Constitutional Court quashed the relevant part of the Code of Civil Procedure
because it found the regulation of extraordinary appeal to be unforeseeable.44 The
Parliament then adopted a new law which aimed to finally resolve the problem.45
Looking at the implementation roles of the Czech Constitutional Court, it
initially strove for self-correction, however unsuccessfully. In the latter phases, the
procedures before the Constitutional Court were subject to change (see below).
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court undertook outward-looking measures
and stepped more forcefully into the role of conductor of legislative
implementation (discussed in more detail below) and provoked far-reaching
change as it derogated the regulation of extraordinary appeal and gave the
legislature several hints on how to design the new legislation.
Constitutional courts’ design as object of change
The last example illustrates that sometimes a constitutional court’s self-correction
may be difficult to achieve and larger changes in the domestic legal order may be
necessary even in cases which touch upon the procedure before the constitutional
court. Indeed, on several occasions State parties have even resorted to changing the
design of the proceedings before the constitutional court – or of the constitutional
court itself – in reaction to the European Court’s case law. Constitutional courts
tend to be rather passive in such cases.
Specific features of the proceedings before the constitutional court were fine-
tuned in response to the Strasbourg judgments. In reaction to the Olujić
judgment,46 a constitutional amendment was adopted introducing time limits on
the decision-making of the Croatian Constitutional Court in cases concerning the
disciplinary responsibility of judges.47 Organisational changes with respect to
constitutional courts were also taken in order to implement the European Court’s
rulings. For example in Peša the Strasbourg Court ruled that Croatia had violated,
inter alia, Article 5(3) ECHR because the Croatian Constitutional Court had not
decided on the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention in a timely manner.48
In response, a new section of the Croatian Constitutional Court was established.
This section was charged with deciding on those constitutional complaints which
required particular promptness, such as detention cases.49 In Germany, as part of
the struggle to comply with the Strasbourg case law on excessively lengthy
44 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 21 February 2012, Pl. ÚS 29/11.
45Law No. 404/2012 Coll.; see also Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)58, 30 April 2013. It remains
questionable, though, whether the amendment has resolved the whole issue.
46ECtHR 2 February 2009, Case No. 22330/05, Olujić v Croatia.
47Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)194, 2 December 2011.
48ECtHR 8 April 2010, Case No. 40523/08, Peša v Croatia.
49Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)195, 2 December 2011.
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proceedings, an additional registry of the Federal Constitutional Court was set up
and additional legal staff members were employed in the Court’s research
department.50
Constitutional courts and jurisprudential implementation
of the European Court’s judgments
More often, the sources of ECHR violation lie in the substantive opinions of
domestic courts and administrative bodies. Changes in domestic case law – including
the constitutional courts’ jurisprudence – are thus often necessary in order to
comply with the European Court’s judgments. Scholars have come up with two
different narratives in this context. On the one hand, it can be assumed that
constitutional courts as courts with human rights expertise will be prone to apply
ECHR standards. With respect to their specific position within the judiciary, some
constitutional courts are well situated to orchestrate domestic jurisprudential
responses to Strasbourg case law. Moreover, most constitutional courts are entitled to
review and quash the decisions of the ordinary judiciary and administrative bodies if
they contravene the constitution. The fact that the rulings of many constitutional
courts have gained de facto precedential value51 implies that constitutional courts are
particularly well-designed for the diffusing of ECHR standards to the rest of the
judiciary. On the other hand, constitutional courts can also act in a contrary manner.
They might prefer to guard their own constitutional autonomy or might simply
prefer developing domestic constitutional rights case law without engaging with
the ECHR.52
The following sections show that when constitutional courts are involved in the
initial phases of implementation, they can act as conductors orchestrating
jurisprudential implementation. When involved in subsequent phases, they
evaluate other actors’ implementation measures.
Constitutional courts as conductors of jurisprudential implementation
On many occasions, constitutional courts have served as the domestic introducers
of the interpretations, concepts and standards of review employed by the
European Court. Constitutional courts sometimes even overrule their own case
law in order to comply with the Strasbourg Court’s approach. Even then
50Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)244, 5 December 2013. See also E. Lambert Abdelgawad and
A. Weber, ‘The Reception Process in France and Germany’, in Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n. 9,
p. 107 at p. 135-136.
51E.g. W. Sadurski, Rights Before Courts (Springer 2014) p. 67.
52Stone Sweet and Keller, supra n. 17, p. 20. See also ‘Favourable attitude of the constitutional
court’, below.
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constitutional courts act as conductors of jurisprudential implementation
because they must ensure this change is reflected by ordinary courts and
executive bodies.
In that way, constitutional courts have introduced Strasbourg standards into
various areas of law. The Czech Constitutional Court has, for instance, overruled
its own case law53 and altered its approach to the right to effective investigation
under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. At the same time, it has imposed the standards
flowing from Articles 2 and 3 ECHR on police authorities.54 The European
Court’s case law concerning the right to effective investigation has also influenced
other constitutional courts. The Spanish Constitutional Court issued six rulings in
2008 addressing the right to effective investigation55 and held that it requires
‘adequate and effective investigation of the elements reported’, which implies
‘special instructions to ensure that all reasonable lines of investigation are pursued
in ascertaining the fact’.56
In another set of cases, the Croatian Constitutional Court changed its case law
on procedural rights in eviction proceedings in response to the European Court’s
judgments in Ćosić57 and Paulić.58 It also stressed the duty of the judiciary to align
its practices to the obligations stemming from the Convention. As a result,
application of the proportionality analysis – even by ordinary courts – is
improving.59
Besides such instances of a constitutional court’s contribution to
jurisprudential implementation, constitutional courts have also shown the limits
of transmitting Strasbourg standards. Such limits can take the form of ongoing
dialogues with the Strasbourg Court, of narrow readings of Strasbourg rulings, or
even of disregard and rejection of the European Court’s case law.
First, constitutional courts sometimes engage quite creatively with Strasbourg
case law and initiate judicial dialogue with the European Court. Such dialogue has
two important aspects for the purposes of this article. First, constitutional courts
sometimes try to reshape Strasbourg case law in order to secure smoother
compliance with domestic constitutional standards while at the same time trying
to persuade the European Court to reflect their reshaping efforts and revisit its
own case law accordingly.
53 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 12 August 2014, I. ÚS 3196/12, para 15.
54 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 2 March 2015, I. ÚS 1565/14.
55Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)266, 2 December 2011.
56 Id., referring to the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court, no. 34/2008.
57ECtHR 15 January 2009, Case No. 28261/06, Ćosić v Croatia.
58ECtHR 22 October 2009, Case No. 3572/06, Paulić v Croatia.
59Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)48, 8 June 2011; K. Turković and J. Omejec, ‘Commitment to
reform: Assessing the impact of the ECtHR’s case law on reinforcing democratization efforts in
Croatian legal order’, in Motoc and Ziemele, supra n. 25, p. 119-120.
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The German Bundesverfassungsgericht is well-known for its dialogues with the
European Court.60 A primary example of such a dialogical jurisprudential
implementation is the von Hannover saga concerning publication of photographs of
Princess Caroline von Hannover. Both the German Constitutional Court and the
EuropeanCourt had been balancingCaroline vonHannover’s right to privacywith the
freedom of expression of the press. Unlike the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the European
Court struck the balance in favour of vonHannover’s privacy. Yet in a subsequent case,
theGermanConstitutional Court again ruled in favour of the newspapers and rejected
von Hannover’s complaint. Nevertheless, it acknowledged the European Court’s
judgment and employed the proportionality analysis – adjusted to Strasbourg
standards.61 This time the EuropeanCourt found no violation of the ECHR, although
the facts of the case did not differ substantially from the previous one, and deferred to
the German Constitutional Court.62 This case shows that some constitutional courts
do not automatically mirror what the Strasbourg Court has said but instead
‘translate’63 its rulings and adapt them to the domestic constitutional landscape.
Going beyond engagement and reshaping the Strasbourg jurisprudence,
constitutional courts can also resist the European Court and reject its conclusions.
The Austrian Constitutional Court’s 1987 Miltner judgment illustrates this. The
main question was whether the neighbours’ objection to a construction project fell
within the term ‘determination of civil rights’ in which case, according to Article 6
ECHR, it would need to be decided upon by an independent and impartial
tribunal. Although the Strasbourg case law suggested as much, the Austrian
Constitutional Court refused to do so. It held that the case at hand affected civil
rights, but not at their core. Hence, the case could be decided by an administrative
agency, not necessarily by a tribunal in the sense of Article 6 ECHR. According to
the Austrian Constitutional Court, the European Court’s overbroad interpretation
of the term ‘civil rights’ was contrary to the constitutionally entrenched Austrian
administrative system. Therefore, the Austrian Constitutional Court decided to
depart from the Strasbourg Court’s interpretations.64
60E. Bjørge, ‘National supreme courts and the development of ECHR rights’, 9 ICON (2011)
p. 5 at p. 26.
61 J. Rackow, ‘From Conflict to Cooperation: The Relationship between Karlsruhe and
Strasbourg’, in K. Ziegler et al. (eds.), The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained
Relationship? (Hart 2015) p. 379 at p. 382.
62 Id.
63A. Paulus, ‘From Implementation to Translation: Applying the ECtHR Judgments in the
Domestic Legal Order’, in A. Seibert-Fohr and M.E. Villiger (eds.), Judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights – Effects and Implementation (Nomos 2014) p. 273 at p. 278.
64Verfassungsgerichthof, 14 October 1987, Miltner, VfSlg 11500/1987; D. Thurnerr,
‘The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland’, in Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n. 9,
p. 361; N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 113.
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Constitutional courts as evaluators of jurisprudential implementation
Ordinary courts (and administrative bodies) can act as autonomous
implementation actors without being nudged to do so by a constitutional court.
As the ECHR mandate of ordinary judges de facto introduced elements of
decentralised control of Conventionality in some countries,65 the ordinary courts
could implement Strasbourg case law on their own, even before the constitutional
court came into play. That brings us to the category in which constitutional courts
react to law-applying bodies’ efforts to implement the European Court’s
judgments. Constitutional courts then act as evaluators of jurisprudential
implementation.
If the constitutional court is only involved in the implementation process at a
later stage, it usually either acknowledges and bolsters the conclusions of the
ordinary courts or fine-tunes certain aspects of their rulings. The Czech Supreme
Administrative Court has, for example, domestically introduced the Strasbourg
standards concerning the dissolution of political parties.66 TheCzechConstitutional
Court subsequently confirmed the ruling and acknowledged those standards.67One
does rather exceptionally encounter cases in which an ordinary court aligns its case
law with the European Court’s conclusions and the constitutional court
subsequently takes a less Strasbourg-friendly approach and overturns the decision.
The interplay between the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice and the
Constitutional Court (addressed below) comes close to this.
Constitutional courts and legislative implementation of the
European Court’s judgments
Violations of the Convention are frequently caused by domestic legislation.
The Strasbourg Court is not, however, entitled to strike down domestic
laws.68 Nevertheless, since European constitutional courts have become
important actors in the processes of domestic law-making,69 they often partner
with the European Court and function as its lever in striking down legislation
incompatible with the ECHR. Intertwining of the supervision of constitutionality
65Ferreres Comella, supra n. 5, p. 140-142; L. Besselink, ‘The Proliferation of Constitutional Law
and Constitutional Adjudication, or How American Judicial Review Came to Europe After All’,
9 Utrecht Law Review (2013) p. 19 at p. 25.
66 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, 17 Feb 2010, Pst 1/
2009-348.
67Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court, 27 May 2010, Pl. ÚS 13/10.
68Sadurksi, supra n. 7, p. 441.
69A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University
Press 2000); A.R. Brewer-Carías (ed.), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators (Cambridge
University Press 2013) p. 153-164.
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and Conventionality with use of the ECHR as a benchmark for constitutional
review (which is the case with some European constitutional courts)70 plays a
crucial role. Employing various techniques, constitutional courts can significantly
contribute to the legislative implementation of Strasbourg judgments.
When involved in the initial phases of implementation, constitutional courts
can act as conductors of legislative implementation. Yet they also react to
the implementation efforts of the legislature and fulfil the role of evaluators of
legislative implementation.
Constitutional courts as conductors of legislative implementation
Constitutional courts can use their powers to remove legislative obstacles to
compliance with the ECHR. They can do so either through ECHR-compatible
interpretation of domestic laws or by quashing ECHR-incompatible legislation.
As to the reinterpretation of domestic laws, in Frankowicz71 Poland had breached
Article 10 ECHR whenMr. Frankowicz was convicted in disciplinary proceedings
for criticising the medical practices of a fellow doctor. In reaction to the European
Court’s ruling, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal did not quash the provision of
the Code of Medical Ethics but instead held that it could not be interpreted as
prohibiting truthful public assessment of the activities of a doctor by a colleague in
the public interest. Thus, the Constitutional Tribunal indicated that only ECHR-
compatible interpretations of the law were constitutionally acceptable.72
A typical example of ensuring legislative compliance by abolishing problematic
pieces of legislation is the derogation of legislation excluding certain matters from
judicial review. In response to Lauko73 and Kadubec,74 the Slovakian Constitutional
Court quashed a provision preventing the courts from reviewing minor offences for
which a fine lower than 2000 SKK had been imposed.75 Relying on Lauko and
Kadubec, the Czech Constitutional Court abolished similar provisions in Czech law.76
In some cases, however, negative legislating was insufficient. Although a
constitutional court could quash problematic legislation, it would then be up to
the legislature to act. In Chruściński,77 the Strasbourg Court had found a violation
of Article 5(4) ECHR when neither the detainee nor his lawyer had been allowed
70See supra n. 12.
71ECtHR 16 December 2008, Case No. 53025/99, Frankowicz v Poland.
72Resolution CM/ResDH(2012)200, 6 December, 2012.
73ECtHR 2 September 1998, Case No. 26138/95, Lauko v Slovakia.
74ECtHR 2 September 1998, Case No. 27061/95, Kadubec v Slovakia.
75Resolution DH (99) 554, 8 October 1999. See also M. Kryzyanowska-Mieryewska, ‘The
Reception Process in Poland and Slovakia’, in Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n. 9, p. 579-580.
76 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 17 January 2001, Pl. ÚS 9/2000.
77ECtHR 6 November 2007, Case No. 22755/04, Chruściński v Poland.
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to consult the case file in the detention proceedings. The Polish Constitutional
Tribunal subsequently declared the relevant statutory provision unconstitutional
and invited Parliament to adopt new legislation respecting its conclusions. As a
provisional measure, the Constitutional Tribunal gave the law-applying bodies
instructions on how to interpret the law before Parliament acted. Following the
Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment, the Polish Parliament amended the wording
of the provision at stake, which now regulated the detainee’s access to evidence in
the detention proceedings.78 Apart from derogating the problematic legislation,
some constitutional courts are also active in giving the legislature guidelines on
how to remedy the situation and how the new legislation should be phrased.79
Prompt adoption of fully compliant legislation by the legislature after a
constitutional court’s intervention cannot be taken for granted, though. For
instance, the Czech Constitutional Court, taking into account the European
Court’s case law involving other countries, abolished a provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that prevented detainees from attending court hearings for the
review of the lawfulness of their detention.80 However, the law-making authorities
only amended the law81 in 2011 after a series of ‘convicting’ judgments from the
Strasbourg Court82 stating, inter alia, that the intervention of the constitutional
court alone had not rectified the problem as more detailed legislative regulation
was necessary.83 A similar pattern of synergy involving the Strasbourg Court and a
domestic constitutional court can be found in the Polish case concerning judicial
assessors. First, the Constitutional Tribunal – relying on the European Court’s
Article 6(1) ECHR jurisprudence – ruled that the regulation of the assessors’ status
violated the principle of judicial independence. Subsequently, the Strasbourg
Court confirmed this position in Urban,84 which ultimately led to the legislative
abolition of the institution of judicial assessors in 2009.85
Moving on to other techniques commonly employed by constitutional courts,
there are a number of cases in which a constitutional court goes beyond the
automatic reception of the European Court’s conclusions. These cases range from
domestic adaptation of the Strasbourg case law, its narrow reading to rejection of
78Resolution CM/ResDH (2011) 142, 14 September 2011. See also Garlicki and Kondak, supra
n. 11, p. 314.
79Brewer-Carías, supra n. 69, p. 153-164.
80 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 22 March 2005, Pl. ÚS 45/04.
81Act No. 459/2011 Coll.
82ECtHR 4December 2008, Case No. 19970/04;Husák v the Czech Republic; ECtHR 26March
2009, Case No. 39298/04 and 8723/05, Krejčíř v the Czech Republic; ECtHR 28 October 2010,
Case No. 20157/05 Knebl v the Czech Republic.
83Knebl, supra n. 82, para. 87.
84ECtHR 30 November 2010, Case No. 23614/08, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v Poland.
85Garlicki and Kondak, supra n. 11, p. 317-318.
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the Strasbourg judgments. Also in the legislative implementation of Strasbourg
case law, one can witness the constitutional courts’ efforts to reshape the European
Court’s case law and square its requirements with domestic constitutional
traditions through a dialogue with the Strasbourg Court. An example of such
domestic reshaping, or translation,86 of the Strasbourg case law is the German
preventive detention saga. The European Court had declared that the German
system of preventive detention amounted to a penalty in the sense of Article 7(1)
ECHR. Therefore, it was not possible to retroactively prolong the detention.87
The German Constitutional Court took into account the European Court’s
conclusions, but insisted that preventive detention should not be qualified as a
penalty.88 The German Constitutional Court ‘translated’ the European Court’s
demands into the language of proportionality and legitimate expectations.89
Subsequently, the German Parliament adopted legislation phrased along the lines
of the German Constitutional Court’s directives.90
Recent examples show that constitutional courts can also try to restrict the
effect of Strasbourg case law in the domestic realm. I will illustrate this with two
examples concerning the Italian Constitutional Court.91 First, constitutional
courts can limit the impact of a single Strasbourg ruling. In its decision no. 236/
2011, which concerned the principle of lex mitior, the Italian Constitutional
Court reviewed the relevant Strasbourg case law but held: ‘In the light of the
considerations set out above, it is not arbitrary to conclude that the recognition by
the European Court of the principle of retroactivity in mitius […] did not
preclude the ability to introduce exceptions or restrictions on its applicability
when supported by a valid justification’.92 Commentators claim that in this ruling
the Italian Constitutional Court, by emphasising the differences in context
between the cases, had in effect limited the reach of the European Court’s ruling.93
86Paulus, supra n. 63, p. 273.
87ECtHR 17 December 2009, Case No. 19359/04 M v Germany.
88E. Klein, ‘Germany’, in Gerards and Fleuren, supra n. 10, p 207.
892 BvR 2365/09, 4 May 2011, 128 BVerfGE, 326. A press release in English is available
at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2011/bvg11-031.html>,
visited 8 July 2018.
90Donald and Leach, supra n. 25, p. 288-289. See also the Communication from Germany
concerning the case of M. and others against Germany (Application No. 19359/04), DH-DD
(2014)1463, 1 December 2014, available at the HUDOC EXEC database (hudoc.exec.coe.int/).
91This is not to say that the Italian Constitutional Court is the only one using such techniques.
I have chosen the Italian examples because they have been well documented by Giuseppe Martinico
(supra n. 16).
92 Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 236/2011. English translation available at: <www.
cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S2011236_Quaranta_Lattanzi_
en.pdf>, visited 8 July 2018.
93Martinico, supra n. 16, p. 74.
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More recently, the Italian Constitutional Court has tried to restrict the reach of
Strasbourg case law on a more general level. As the Italian system of constitutional
review is based on the incidental review of legislation initiated by ordinary
courts,94 the European Court’s case law often serves as a basis for questioning
the constitutionality of Italian legislation, and in doing so bringing it to the
Constitutional Court’s attention.95 In its judgment no. 49/2015, however, the
Italian Constitutional Court ‘indirectly tried to put the brakes on the European
Court’s evolutionary jurisprudence itself’.96 The Corte Constituzionale held that
Italian judges should rely only on well-established case law of the European Court
and laid down several conditions that should discourage ordinary judges from
blindly following the European Court.97 The Italian Constitutional Court thus
sent a signal to the ordinary courts: they should think twice before referring a case
to the Constitutional Court due to the Strasbourg case law.98
Furthermore, recent developments in Russia should be mentioned. In 2015,
a group of Russian deputies asked the Russian Constitutional Court to review
the constitutionality of the Law on Ratification of the ECHR and other norms.
Their argument was that these provisions directed Russian authorities to
implement the European Court’s judgments even if they violated the Russian
Constitution. The Russian Constitutional Court did not abolish those norms.
However, it declared that neither the Convention nor its interpretation by the
Strasbourg Court took precedence over the Russian Constitution.99 The Russian
Parliament then followed the Constitutional Court’s suggestion and adopted a
94See V. Barsotti et al., Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (Oxford University Press
2016) p. 54; J. Ferejohn and P. Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style’, in
T. Ginsburg (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press 2014) p.
294.
95A. Pin, ‘A Jurisprudence to Handle with Care: The European Court of Human Rights’
Unsettled Case Law, its Authority, and its Future, According to the Italian Constitutional Court’,
Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 1 May 2015, <www.iconnectblog.com/2015/04/mini-symposium-on-cc-
judgment-49-2015>, visited 8 July 2018.
96 Id.
97Such as excessive creativity, inconsistency with other judgments of the European Court,
existence of strong dissenting opinions, the fact that the decision originates from an ordinary division
and has not been endorsed by the Grand Chamber, or the fact that the European Court has failed to
assess the particular characteristics of the national legal system. Italian Constitutional Court
judgment no. 49/2015. English translation available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/
download/doc/recent_judgments/S49_2015_en.pdf>, visited 8 July 2018.
98Pin, supra n. 95.
99Russian Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015, No. 21-П/2015. English summary is available at
<www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/resume%202015%2021-П.pdf>, visited
8 July 2018. See also L. Mälksoo, ‘Russia’s Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of
Human Rights: Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-
П/2015’, 12 EuConst (2016) p. 377.
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statute introducing the Constitutional Court’s competence to declare the
execution of an international obligation impossible if it contradicted the
Constitution. In 2016, the Russian Constitutional Court used this competence
for the first time when it declared the European Court’s Anchugov and Gladkov
ruling, which addressed prisoner voting rights, to be non-executable.100 This
judgment held that the European Court’s conclusions were incompatible with
the Constitution, which seems to add up to blocking the legislative
implementation of Anchugov and Gladkov. Nevertheless, the Russian
Constitutional Court also included a somewhat compromising passage in
which it tried to square the view of the European Court with Russian law by
referring to the possibility of other State authorities optimising the system of
criminal penalties, which could have implications for the voting rights of
convicted persons.101 Whether such changes will take place and with what effect
is a question for the future.102
Constitutional courts as evaluators of legislative implementation
Parliaments and the executive bodies adopting secondary legislation also act on
their own and adopt legislative responses to Strasbourg case law, even without
prior encouragement from a constitutional court. Nonetheless, constitutional
courts can react later and evaluate such legislation adopted in reaction to the
European Court’s rulings.
Besides acknowledging and supporting the legislative steps towards
implementation, constitutional courts act as fine-tuners of such legislation.
By doing so they acknowledge the implementation efforts of the legislature
but press it for greater compliance. In Austria, the Parliament took steps to
liberalise the legal regime of broadcasting services in response to the European
100Russian Constitutional Court, 19 April 2016, No. 12-П/2016. English translation available at
<www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2016_April_19_12-P.pdf>, visited 8 July
2018. For the second time, the Russian Constitutional Court used this power in the Yukos case,
which, however, concerned only individual measures of execution. See Russian Constitutional
Court, 19 January 2017, No.1-П/2017, English translation available at <www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/
Judgments/Documents/2017_January_19_1-P.pdf>, visited 8 July 2018.
101See M. Aksenova, ‘Anchugov and Gladkov is not Enforceable: the Russian Constitutional
Court Opines in its First ECtHR Implementation Case’, Opinio Juris, 25 April 2016, <www.
opiniojuris.org/2016/04/25/anchugov-and-gladkov-is-not-enforceable-the-russian-constitutional-
court-opines-in-its-first-ecthr-implementation-case/>, visited 8 July 2018.
102See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Russian
Federation: Final opinion on the amendments to the federal constitutional law on the Constitutional
Court (2016) 10, <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD
(2016)016-e>, visited 8 July 2018.
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Court’s judgment in Informationsverein Lentia.103 The Austrian Constitutional
Court, however, subsequently abolished certain parts of those laws as they
violated the principle of legality and still failed to meet certain requirements
of the Convention. The legislature then clarified and refined the respective
laws.104
Constitutional courts sometimes also contribute to the emergence of
implementation difficulties and substantive delays, as a Romanian example
shows. The criminalisation of defamation in Romania had been a problematic
issue for many years. With its 1999 ruling in Dălban,105 the European Court
entered into the debate when it held that the conviction of a journalist in the given
case had violated Article 10 ECHR. A complicated battle ensued over the
decriminalisation of defamation. In 2006, full decriminalisation was achieved by
means of legislative amendment. However, the very next year, the Romanian
Constitutional Court abolished the new legislation decriminalising defamation as
unconstitutional: ‘By the repealing of the mentioned legal provisions was created
an inadmissible legislative lacuna, contrary to the constitutional provision
that guarantees human dignity as a supreme value’.106 In 2010, however, the
Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice ruled that the legal provisions
criminalising insult and libel were not in force as they had not been recriminalised
by the legislature.107 The Constitutional Court answered in 2013. It referred
to the European Court’s case law and took it into account. However,
the Constitutional Court bolstered its 2007 decision and made clear that the
rules criminalising insult and libel were applicable.108 Later that year, the
lower chamber of the Romanian Parliament even voted to recriminalise
defamation explicitly. However, the Senate rejected the measure. In the end, the
new Criminal Code adopted in 2014 did not include the criminalisation of insult
and libel.109
103ECtHR 24 November 1993, Case No. 13914/88; 15041/89; 15717/89; 15779/89; 17207/
90, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria.
104Resolution DH (98) 142, 11 June 1998.
105ECtHR 28 September 1999, Case No. 28114/95, Dalban v Romania.
106Romanian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 62 of 18 January 2007. English translation
available at <www.ccr.ro/files/products/D0062_07.pdf>, visited 8 July 2018.
107High Court of Cassation and Justice (Romania), Decision No. 8 of 18 October 2010, as
referred to in Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)73, 8 June 2011, and in the decision of the Romanian
Constitutional Court, infra n. 108.
108Romanian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 206 of 29 April 2013. English translation
available at <www.ccr.ro/files/products/Decizie_206_2013en.pdf>, visited 8 July 2018.
109Donald and Leach, supra n. 25, at p. 221.
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Varying partnership capacity of constitutional courts
The typology shows the forms the partnership between the European Court and
constitutional courts takes. At the same time, cases cited in the previous parts
demonstrate the benefits of the partnership for the ECHR system. First of all,
constitutional courts can significantly contribute to the enforcement of Strasbourg
case law when accepting the European Court’s conclusions. When their role is to
engage in self-correction, when they orchestrate legislative or jurisprudential
implementation and even when they evaluate other actors’ implementation
efforts, they diffuse the European Court’s conclusions domestically. Also, they
facilitate preventing human rights violations or at least remedying them at the
national level.110 Thereby, constitutional courts can raise the domestic legitimacy
of a Strasbourg ruling and of the Strasbourg Court itself. A constitutional court’s
involvement in the domestic enforcement of Strasbourg judgments can be
interpreted as an approval of the European Court’s conclusions by the main
guardian of constitutional rights and, accordingly, as an additional legitimacy
input.111
Another positive consequence of the partnership for the ECHR system is that
constitutional courts fulfil the function of overseeing implementation. When they
act as evaluators of legislative and jurisprudential implementation, they react to
other actors’ implementation efforts, which has important implications for the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the system. Supporting and bolstering the
implementation efforts helps to disseminate the European Court’s conclusions
domestically. And, again, it serves as a legitimacy input when the guardian of
domestic constitutional rights approves (or refines) measures inspired by
Strasbourg case law. Fine-tuning implementation measures, in addition, pushes
other actors towards greater compliance with the European Court’s judgment,
which helps to reduce and remedy potential ECHR violations at the national level.
However, the cited cases also show that the fruits of the constitutional courts’
partnership cannot be taken for granted. The situation is complicated by each
constitutional court’s interaction with other domestic actors and by a growing
number of instances of more creative engagement with, and even resistance to, the
European Court’s case law.112 Hence, some constitutional courts are better placed
than others for partnering with the European Court and contributing to the
110Kosař and Petrov, supra n. 4; Helfer, supra n. 1.
111See similarly Paris, supra n. 6.
112 If creative engagement is carried out in good faith, the ECHR system can profit from that. See
‘Favourable attitude of the constitutional court’ below, which argues that such engagement can
amount to constitutional courts functioning as mediators between the national and the international
within the ECHR system. Such a mediating function can be seen as another benefit of the
partnership with constitutional courts.
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ECHR system; furthermore in some cases more than in others. A constitutional
court’s partnership capacity, i.e. the ability to play the roles listed in the typology
and to secure successful implementation of (and compliance with) the European
Court’s case law, varies from country to country and from case to case.
In the following sections, this article argues that the effective partnership
capacity of a constitutional court is subject to three sets of conditions – a
favourable institutional setting, a favourable political setting and favourable
attitude of the constitutional court towards the Strasbourg judgment.113 All these
conditions affect a constitutional court’s partnership capacity, namely whether the
constitutional court can be involved in the roles listed in the typology, whether it is
able to ensure compliance domestically and whether it is willing to ensure
compliance.
Favourable institutional setting
Constitutional courts are not self-activating institutions and their involvement in
European Court’s case law implementation mechanisms depends on other actors.
Access to a constitutional court – the question of who can bring a claim and
activate a constitutional court – is a crucial ‘ingredient’ of a constitutional court’s
institutional design.114 In the European Court’s case law implementation context,
the number of access channels influences the likelihood that the constitutional
court will be ‘activated’ and affects which of the typology roles it will be able
to play.
Typical modes of activating a constitutional court are by official, legislative or
judicial reference, or with an individual petition (constitutional complaint).115
The legislative referral is important for the constitutional courts’ roles as
conductors and evaluators of legislative implementation. A parliamentary
minority can make a reference requesting that the constitutional court deals
with the legislative obstacle of complying with the ECHR even if the majority does
not address the issue on its own. However, such an action byMPs cannot be taken
for granted. There are issues that might never be referred to the constitutional
113All three groups of conditions matter for the constitutional courts’ capacity to play the roles of
conductor or evaluator of jurisprudential and legislative implementation. A constitutional court’s
self-correction capacity mostly depends on the attitude of the constitutional court. When a
constitutional court’s design is subject to change (see above), the constitutional court’s role is rather
passive. Consequently, I have left this aside when discussing partnership capacity.
114T. Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 37; P.
Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy’, 11 Ratio Juris (1998) p. 98 at p. 116.
115A. Harding et al., ‘Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice in Comparative
Perspective’, 3 JCL (2008) p. 1 at p. 7. Official reference denotes cases referred by a named official
(president, ombudsman) or agency.
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court – issues of low political salience, not interesting for the opposition, or, on the
contrary, all too salient issues that the opposition does not dare risk opening
because they are too politically divisive, e.g. the rights of unpopular minorities.
Also, the majority and the opposition do regularly agree on certain topics.
Since legislative referrals and the logic of political competition do not
automatically secure the activation of a constitutional court, judicial reference and
constitutional complaint gain importance. Ordinary courts or individual citizens –
actors not subject to partisan considerations – can refer issues to the constitutional
court. The activation of the constitutional court by means of a judicial reference
depends on the de facto discretion of an ordinary court. The precondition is that
the ordinary courts recognise the constitutional and ECHR dimensions of the case
and decide to activate the constitutional court. If an ordinary court ignores those
dimensions or decides to resolve the issue on its own, the only remaining
possibility for activating the constitutional court is with a constitutional
complaint, if available.
The availability of a constitutional complaint mechanism is crucial for a
constitutional court’s capacity in the role of conductor and evaluator of the
jurisprudential implementation. If an ordinary court fails to recognise and address
the constitutional and/or ECHR dimensions of a case and no constitutional
complaint mechanism is available, a constitutional court is prevented from
fulfilling the role of conductor of jurisprudential implementation. If an ordinary
court recognises the constitutional and/or ECHR dimensions and decides to
resolve the issue on its own, a constitutional court cannot act as an evaluator of
jurisprudential implementation if the legal order does not provide for a
constitutional complaint mechanism.
Yet another important feature of the institutional setting of a constitutional
court is the capacity to strike down the judgments of ordinary courts. It is a
defining feature of Kelsenian constitutional courts that they are empowered to
invalidate legislation. Yet, not all constitutional courts possess the competence to
strike down judicial decisions. This competence affects a constitutional court’s
ability to fulfil the roles of conductor and evaluator of jurisprudential
implementation. If a constitutional court does not possess this competence,
then an ordinary court has final say in interpreting the constitutional court’s
judgment. In such cases, a constitutional court does not have many instruments at
its disposal to enforce its opinions within the ordinary judiciary. Probably the only
option in such cases is to set aside the relevant statute because the ordinary courts
were not able to construe it in a way compatible with the constitution/ECHR.116
Besides the access channels and competences, another institutional feature
seemingly crucially affecting a constitutional court’s partnership capacity is the
116L. Garlicki, ‘Constitutional courts versus supreme courts’, 5 ICON (2007) p. 44 at p. 67.
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status of the ECHR. If the Convention possesses subconstitutional status and the
source of violation lies with the Constitution itself, the constitutional court may
have to rely on other actors’ steps leading to constitutional amendment if it is
impossible to interpret the Constitution in harmony with the ECHR as
interpreted by the European Court.117 More generally, however, the
significance of this feature needs some qualification. In practice, constitutional
courts have quite a wide range of discretion as regards using the Convention as a
standard of review.118 Accordingly, what matters is the de facto ex post significance
that constitutional courts ascribe to the ECHR, rather than its ex ante de iure
status.119
I will mention but a few examples to demonstrate how the listed institutional
features – especially access and competences – vary in European constitutional
courts and how this affects a constitutional court’s capacity to fulfil the roles listed
in the typology. For instance, the German, Spanish, Slovenian, Czech and Slovak
constitutional courts can be activated by all four types of referral – official,
legislative, judicial, and individual. They have powers allowing both the abstract
and concrete review of legislation, and can decide on constitutional complaints
and eventually quash the decisions of ordinary courts.120 Hence, they can interact
directly with law-making and judicial actors. Within the field of legislative
implementation, those constitutional courts can be called upon to rectify ECHR-
problematic legislation by all four groups of actors. Thereby, the institutional
setting of those constitutional courts facilitates acting as conductors or evaluators
of legislative implementation. In addition, those constitutional courts all have the
competence to review judicial decisions upon constitutional complaints and
ultimately, to abolish the decisions of ordinary courts.121 That enables those
constitutional courts to play the roles of conductor and evaluator of jurisprudential
implementation, too. Individuals affected by the non-compliance of a lower court
with a constitutional court’s rulings can bring the case back to the constitutional
court by filing a constitutional complaint. Quashing a non-compliant decision of
an ordinary court then gives the constitutional court the capacity to impose its will
117See e.g. the Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s reaction to ECtHR [GC] 6 January 2011, Case
No. 34932/04, Paksas v Lithuania. A. Padskocimaite, ‘Constitutional Courts and (Non)execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Cases from Russia and
Lithuania’, 77 Heidelberg J Int'l L (2017) p. 651.
118Paris, supra n. 6.
119Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n. 9, p. 683.
120D. Kommers and R. Miller, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of
the German Federal Constitutional Court’, 3 JCL (2008) p. 194 at p. 202-203. I leave aside other
powers such as deciding conflicts between state organs or conflicts between the central and local
institutions, which are usually not crucial in the context of ECHR implementation.
121See M. de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe (Hart 2014) p. 171-175.
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on the lower courts.122 Altogether, with respect to their institutional setting, those
constitutional courts are well-equipped to act as self-correctors, conductors of
legislative and jurisprudential implementation, and as evaluators of legislative and
jurisprudential implementation.
There is some variation in the design of constitutional complaints, though.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal is accessible, inter alia, by individual
reference. But unlike in the German system, the Polish constitutional complaint
cannot directly challenge the decision of an ordinary court. It can only challenge
the constitutionality of the statute upon which the judicial decision was
based.123 This means that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal can only target the
legislation in question. It cannot quash the decision of an ordinary court.
Therefore, its ability to conduct and evaluate jurisprudential implementation is
reduced and its partnership capacity is largely limited to self-correction and
conducting and evaluating the legislative implementation of the European
Court’s judgments.
For the Italian Constitutional Court, review of legislation initiated by means of
judicial reference is a central feature.124 The institutional setting surrounding the
Italian Constitutional Court is distinctive because of its two main limitations: the
‘screening function’ of ordinary judges in activating the constitutional court; and
the fact that only laws can be the object of constitutional review.125 Ordinary
judges act as the ‘gatekeepers’ of constitutional review who decide on the
activation of the constitutional court.126 This has repercussions for the Italian
Constitutional Courts’ partnership capacity. If an ordinary court fails to activate
the Constitutional Court, the latter’s capacity to conduct legislative and
jurisprudential implementation, and correct it or refine it within the evaluating
role, is highly restricted. Even if an ordinary court does refer the case to the
Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court decides, its ability to influence
the outcome is limited as there is no constitutional complaint mechanism.127
It is, however, true that the Italian Constitutional Court has introduced
elaborate techniques of communication with the ordinary courts – different
modes for construing the constitutionally compatible interpretation of statutes
122Garlicki, supra n. 116, p. 67.
123Art. 79 of the Polish Constitution.
124Supra n. 94.
125T. Groppi, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a Multilevel System of
Constitutional Review’, 3 JCL (2008) p. 100 at p. 102-103.
126T. Groppi and I. Spigno, ‘The Constitutional Court of Italy’, in A. Jakab et al., Comparative
Constitutional Reasoning (Cambridge University Press 2017) p. 519 at p. 519. Italian judges have
been quite active in this regard. The question is how this practice changes after the Italian
Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 49/2015 (see supra n. 97).
127Garlicki, supra n. 116, p. 67.
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(sentenze interpretative).128 Still, this does not completely compensate for the
Constitutional Court’s lack of control over the ultimate outcome.
Favourable political setting
In addition to the institutional setting, a constitutional court’s partnership capacity is
co-determined by less formal political factors. Even if the constitutional court has
been activated and has the competence to decide on the issue, its ability to push
through change motivated by Strasbourg jurisprudence will be limited by the
constitutional court’s position in the given political system and the local political/
legal culture. For example, in cases of politically sensitive issues when the questions of
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy likely come into the foreground,
some constitutional courts resort to deference vis-à-vis the legislature and leave the
introduction of certain ECHR standards up to parliament.129 However, even if the
constitutional court does intervene, parliament can resort to statutory override or
even to amending the constitution. A Hungarian case concerning the legal definition
of the term ‘family’ exemplifies this. Partly relying on the European Court’s
jurisprudence, the Hungarian Constitutional Court acted as the conductor of
legislative implementation of the European Court’s case law and abolished a
provision defining the term ‘family’ too narrowly. In reaction to the Constitutional
Court’s ruling, however, the definition was not widened. The parliament defied the
Constitutional Court’s efforts to conduct legislative implementation and moved the
narrow definition of ‘family’ into the constitution.130
That brings us to another factor – the constitutional court’s stature, i.e. its
‘gravitas’, the reputation and weight other actors ascribe to it. Gravitas of a particular
constitutional court is crucial for its ability to manoeuvre other domestic actors into
taking a pro-compliance stance and, thereby, pushing through the desired changes.
The German Constitutional Court for instance has been labelled one of the most
powerful courts in the world, the ‘epicentre’ of German constitutionalism.131 Such
stature for a constitutional court increases its partnership capacity because it
promises the efficacy of the constitutional court’s implementation role.
However, the stature of a constitutional court can change over time. Although
the eastern-central European constitutional courts have been described as success
stories,132 recent populist attacks on the Hungarian and Polish constitutional
128Ferejohn and Pasquino, supra n. 94, p. 306.
129Anagnostou, supra n. 13, p. 218.
130K. Bárd, ‘The legal order of Hungary and the European Convention on Human Rights’, in
Motoc and Ziemele, supra n. 25, p. 183-184.
131Kommers and Miller, supra n. 120, p. 55.
132H. Schwartz, ‘Eastern Europe’s Constitutional Courts’, 9 Journal of Democracy (1998) p. 100 at
p. 100.
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courts disrupt that narrative.133 Populist court-curbing techniques tend to
decrease the stature of constitutional courts. Indeed, their goal is to prevent
the constitutional court from deciding at all (jurisdiction stripping, restricting
access channels) or at least keep it from blocking populist reforms. As to the latter,
they aim to ‘tame’ constitutional courts through court-packing or judicial
replacements with loyal appointees and, thereby, preventing constitutional courts
from blocking the populist agenda. As a result, the capacity of a constitutional
court to decide autonomously and give effect to the European Court’s case law
can be greatly diminished. Hence, the de facto judicial independence of the
constitutional court and the culture of political non-interference with the judiciary
is another extremely important factor in the constitutional court’s partnership
capacity.
Favourable attitude of the constitutional court
Factors determining a constitutional court’s partnership capacity, however, do not
lie exclusively within the external political environment. Even if the constitutional
court has been activated, can play the relevant role and is able to secure compliance
with the European Court’s case law, it may not be willing to do so. Several cases
cited above demonstrate that constitutional courts are far from being mere
transmission belts of the Strasbourg Court. In some cases, constitutional courts
engage quite actively with Strasbourg jurisprudence.
When entering into a dialogue with the European Court, constitutional courts
can be seen as the Strasbourg Court’s major partners in (re)shaping ECHR rights.
In the end, ‘delineating the scope of human rights is a deliberative enterprise based
on competing ideals’.134 Constitutional courts have to square individual rights
requirements with the public good and the broader domestic constitutional
landscape.135 With respect to such expertise, constitutional courts are well-
designed to bring yet another benefit to the ECHR system. Besides enforcement
of Strasbourg judgments and supervision of other actors during their
implementation efforts, constitutional courts function as ‘mediators’ between
the national and the international within the ECHR system.136
133B. Bugarič and T. Ginsburg, ‘The Assault on Postcommunist Courts’, 27 Democratization
(2016) p. 69.
134E. Benvenisti and A. Harel, ‘Embracing the tension between national and international human
rights law: The case for discordant parity’, 15 ICON (2017) p. 36 at p. 57.
135See J. Komárek, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy’, 12
ICON (2014) p. 525.
136G. Ulfstein, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and national courts: a constitutional
relationship?’ in O.M. Arnardóttir and A. Buyse (eds.), Shifting Centres of Gravity in Human Rights
Protection (Routledge 2016) p. 46 at p. 57.
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Thus, even discontent with the European Court can be beneficial and
legitimacy-enhancing for the ECHR system, if expressed in a constructive
manner. In such cases, initiation of judicial dialogue should increase deliberation
on the issue at stake, and constitutional courts can take advantage of their
institutional positions and verbalise the interlocutors’ views and values.137
Moreover, constitutional courts can also convey other domestic actors’ views and
values to the deliberative dialogue. Such deliberation can lead to further
development of ECHR norms and to improved mutual understanding between
the European Court and constitutional courts.138 As Amos put it, ‘evidence of
having listened is an important legitimating force’.139 Even the Strasbourg Court’s
legitimacy can profit from the dialogues – if the European Court listens and
engages with a constitutional courts’ views, it ‘cannot be accused of usurping a role
well beyond the scope of the functions devolved to it by Contracting States’.140
However, more problematic cases of rejection of the European Court’s
conclusions, and efforts to restrict the effects of Strasbourg case law, also occur.141
Those cases are rather heterogeneous and difficult to grasp. They range from
limited pushbacks that seek to influence the European Court’s case law in a given
area, to backlash seeking a reshuffling of authority within the ECHR system.142
Sometimes, resistance is issue-specific and driven by a constitutional court’s
differing interpretation of a constitutional feature.143 Sometimes, it is a result of
judicial politics within a constitutional court. Kosař and Petrov have argued that
resistance can be a result of the preferences of the various actors within the
constitutional court.144 For instance, if the constitutional court’s individual judges
view the European Court as an obstacle to their judicial autonomy, they may try to
suppress the domestic effects of Strasbourg case law.145 Other cases of
constitutional courts’ resistance, however, reveal deeper gaps between the
constitutional court and the European Court. Resistance can be a result of
differing political-legal conceptions of rights and constitutionalism as advocated
137L.B. Tremblay, ‘The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and
legislatures’, 3 ICON (2005) p. 617 at p. 632.
138See generally V. Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement’,
119 Harv. L. Rev. (2005) p. 109 at p. 116.
139M. Amos, ‘The dialogue between United Kingdom courts and the European Court of
Human Rights’, 61 ICLQ (2012) p. 557 at p. 575.
140Sadurski, supra n. 7, p. 442.
141See supra nn. 64, 99 and 108.
142See generallyM.R. Madsen et al., ‘Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the Forms
and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts’, 14 International Journal of Law in Context
(2018) p. 197 at p. 200.
143E.g. the Austrian Constitutional Court in the Miltner case, supra n. 64.
144Kosař and Petrov, supra n. 4.
145 Id.
527Unpacking the partnership
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019618000299
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Masaryk University Brno School of Social Studies, on 09 Apr 2019 at 07:42:03, subject to the
by the European Court on the one hand and the constitutional court on the other.
Pluralist rights-based constitutionalism open to international law can be rather
easily squared with international human rights constraints. However, more
sovereignty-based visions of constitutionalism may be harder to reconcile with an
international court’s pronouncements.146 The clash between the Russian
Constitutional Court and the European Court, where the Russian
Constitutional Court’s vision of sovereignty within the ECHR system has
played a significant role, comes close to this.147
As a result, the cases of resistance might amount to a hard-to-predict mixture of
a constitutional courts’ defence of its own supremacy, differing constitutional
ideas, judicial egos,148 and national sovereignty. Yet, such cases may eventually
widen the gap between the ECHR and domestic legal orders without offering any
prospect of reconciling the issue at stake. Thus, even though the emergence of
certain ‘inter-layer irritations’149 in the ECHR system is probably inevitable,
I believe it is normatively desirable – from the point of view of both ECHR rights
and domestic constitutional rights – that such discontent be channelled into a
constructive dialogue, leaving space for mutual reflection and accommodation of
the diverging perspectives.
Consequences for politics of implementing the European Court’s case law
The findings presented in this paper have further repercussions for the politics of
implementation of the European Court’s case law. From a short-term perspective
(the implementation of a concrete Strasbourg judgment), constitutional courts
with high partnership capacity can be relied upon. If a constitutional court
operates within a favourable institutional and political setting and has a favourable
attitude towards the Strasbourg judgment at stake, it is likely to be involved,
and should be able and willing to secure compliance with the European
Court’s judgment (by correcting its practices, conducting implementation or
evaluating it). Therefore, the pro-compliance actors can largely rely on the
constitutional court. However, if the constitutional court is difficult to activate in
a given case, faces difficulties enforcing its own views domestically (e.g. due to low
‘gravitas’ or a lack of competence to quash ordinary court decisions), or is opposed
to the European Court’s ruling, its partnership capacity is lower. In such cases,
146See A. Hunneeus, ‘Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varied Authority’,
79 Law and Contemporary Problems (2016) p. 179 at p. 180.
147Aksenova, supra n. 101; Mälksoo, supra n. 99, p. 388 (both criticising the Russian
Constitutional Court’s sovereignty-centred approach).
148See, mutatis mutandis, J. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Judicial Ego’, 9 ICON (2011) p. 1.
149C. O’Cinneide, ‘Human Rights within Multi-Layered Systems of Constitutional Governance:
Rights Cosmopolitanism and Domestic Particularism in Tension’, 19 Irish Yrbk. Intl. L. (2010) p. 19.
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the Strasbourg Court and the compliance-seeking actors should pay attention to
the particular limits of the constitutional court’s partnership capacity and,
possibly, partner with other actors capable of implementing the judgment. For
instance, when it comes to jurisprudential implementation in the Italian system,
pro-compliance actors should not forget to focus on ordinary judges who hold the
key to activating constitutional adjudication and also have the final say over
implementation of the constitutional court’s and the European Court’s views in
judicial practice.
Anticipating the partnership capacity can be a complicated task, though. The
favourable institutional setting factor should be rather easy to evaluate.
Constitutional courts’ competences and access channels are clearly set out in
constitutions and statute books and should be cognisable. Assessment of the
political setting can be trickier. It is largely a set of informal factors embedded in
the domestic legal and political culture. Still, at least the basic contours of the
political setting can usually be estimated. The third group of factors affecting
the partnership capacity is however the most challenging – the attitude of the
constitutional court. The reaction of a constitutional court can sometimes be
difficult to anticipate. As the examples cited above show, resistance can come both
from generally well-complying countries and poor compliers, from democracies
and hybrid regimes, from younger constitutional courts and more established
ones. Resistance can come in the form of discontent with a particular ruling, but
also as an exemplification of a deeper ideological mismatch between the European
Court and a given constitutional court. Hence, at best the European Court and
the pro-compliance actors can merely second-guess the attitude of a constitutional
court. Although constitutional courts often adopt a positive attitude, this cannot
be taken for granted. Thus, the attitude of a constitutional court to the European
Court’s case law sometimes turns into a hard-to-predict mixture of competing
constitutional ideas, judicial politics, judicial egos and ideas about rights and
constitutionalism as such.
From a long-term perspective, corresponding to the Strasbourg Court’s
‘embeddedness effectiveness’,150 even high partnership capacity constitutional
courts cannot always be relied on as exclusive partners. This article has explained
that the constitutional courts’ involvement in implementation mechanisms is not
automatic but depends on the cases brought before them. Furthermore, the
previous discussion shows that a particular constitutional court’s partnership
capacity can change over time (especially due to changing political settings)151 and
across issues (especially due to the attitude of the constitutional court to the
issue at stake).
150Helfer, supra n. 1.
151See supra n. 133.
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From this it follows that although the European Court’s partnership with
constitutional courts can be extremely fruitful, there are also significant limits and
conditions qualifying such benefits, both short-term and long-term. Accordingly,
the European Court and other actors preferring compliance with its judgments
should take account of those limiting conditions and develop partnerships with
other domestic actors, too. For the Strasbourg Court, there are two main ways of
developing such partnerships: by jurisprudential means; and through socialisation.
Indeed, the European Court has made efforts in both regards. As to the
jurisprudential way, the Strasbourg Court’s recent practice of procedural review
has aimed to motivate both ordinary courts and parliaments to engage with the
European Court’s case law in a more thorough and transparent manner.152 As for
socialisation, the European Court has organised, for example, a series of seminars
entitled ‘Dialogue between Judges’,153 and in 2015 established the Superior
Courts Network to ensure an effective exchange of information with national apex
courts.154 Still, some countries remain absent from those events and networks, and
some are represented only by constitutional court officials.
It should be stated that the purpose of this debate was not to insist that one
model of constitutional adjudication was better or worse than the others. Each
model has its own legal, political and cultural logic and history. Accordingly, very
different patterns of implementation mechanisms can occur across those various
models and, in abstract terms, it would be impossible to conclude which one was
better or worse. Still, such differences should inform the European Court and
other actors interested in successful implementation of Strasbourg case law.
Conclusion
The necessity of a deeper embeddedness of the ECHR in domestic systems is a
topic that has prevailed in the debates on the future of the ECHR system.155
Therefore, we need a more exact understanding of the domestic level of the
Convention system. In this vein, this article has examined the role of
constitutional courts in the implementation of the Strasbourg Court’s
judgments. The article has tried to explain the various forms the European
152M Saul, ‘How and When Can the International Human Rights Judiciary Promote the Human
Rights Role of National Parliaments?’, in M. Saul et al. (eds.), The International Human Rights
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Court’s implementation partnership with constitutional courts has taken, what its
benefits are, and under what conditions it works successfully in practice.
As to the forms of partnership, the article has put forth a typology of the
constitutional courts’ roles in the mechanisms of implementation of the European
Court’s rulings. The typology shows the multiplicity of roles that constitutional
courts can play vis-à-vis other actors when implementing European Court rulings,
and systematises those roles. The constitutional courts’ involvement in the listed
roles usually has positive consequences for the implementation of the European
Court’s rulings. Constitutional courts contribute to their enforcement and, when
acting as evaluators of legislative or jurisprudential implementation, supervise the
implementation efforts of other actors. Besides that, constitutional courts can also
mediate between the national constitutional landscape and the international
human rights requirements as phrased by the European Court.
Nevertheless, constitutional courts’ capacity to deliver those goods cannot be
taken for granted. Constitutional courts vary in their institutional design and the
political setting in which they operate. Moreover, in some cases constitutional
courts do not merely accept the European Court’s conclusions; they might engage
quite creatively with Strasbourg case law, or even resist it. As a result, the
constitutional court’s partnership capacity, i.e. the ability to play the roles listed in
the typology and secure compliance with the European Court’s case law, varies
across countries and across particular cases. The partnership capacity is subject to
three kinds of conditions: a favourable institutional setting (access rules,
competences, de facto domestic status of the Convention); a favourable political
setting (stature of the constitutional court, de facto judicial independence); and a
favourable attitude of the constitutional court towards the European Court’s
judgment. This has further repercussions for the politics of implementation of the
European Court’s case law. The findings of this article suggest that although
constitutional courts are important partners, they are not omnipotent or
absolutely reliable. Accordingly, partnering with actors other than the
constitutional court is crucial in the case of low partnership capacity
constitutional courts. Furthermore, partnering with other actors is generally
important from the long-term perspective too, since estimations of a
constitutional court’s partnership capacity will always include an element of
uncertainty and, moreover, a constitutional court’s partnership capacity can
change over time and across issues.
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